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Incentive systems in a real effort experiment

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Author Info
van Dijk, Frans
Sonnemans, Joep
van Winden, Frans

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Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 45 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 187-214
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:45:y:2001:i:2:p:187-214

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