This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Incentives in Managerial Compensation: A Survey of Experimental Research. (Draft Paper)

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alessandro Rossi

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The issue of designing effective managerial incentives has recently gained considerable attention in both theoretical analysis and business practices. Despite the importance of the theoretical achievements, to date little attempt has been made to test the major theoretical hypotheses empirically. More recently, the debate has been fuelled by the development of economic experimental studies explicitly designed to shed light on how real decision makers behave in such settings. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive survey of experimental contributions to mechanism and incentive design issues and to offer some suggestions for future research.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.cs.unitn.it/R/Doc/003.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy in its series ROCK Working Papers with number 003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1999
Date of revision: 12 Jun 2008
Handle: RePEc:trt:rockwp:003

Contact details of provider:
Postal: via Inama, 5 -- I-38100 Trento TN
Phone: +39-0461-882126
Fax: +39-0461-882124
Email:
Web page: http://rock.cs.unitn.it
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: DISA Università degli Studi di Trento via Inama, 5 I-38100 Trento TN Italy
Email:
Web: http://repec.cs.unitn.it

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Loris Gaio).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2001. "Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 133-161, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. "The incentive effects of tournaments revisited: Evidence from the European PGA tour," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 74-88, February.
  8. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
  9. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 1-33, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1988. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," NBER Working Papers 2638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Sherwin Rosen, 1984. "The Distribution of Prizes in a Match-Play Tournament with Single Eliminations," NBER Working Papers 1516, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Walker, Martin, 1989. "Agency theory: A falsificationist perspective," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 14(5-6), pages 433-453, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-95.
  15. Levinthal, Daniel, 1988. "A survey of agency models of organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 153-185, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-79, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Robert H. Frank, 1984. "Interdependent Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 510-520, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1992. "Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 511-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alessandro Rossi, 2001. "The Effective Design of Managerial Incentive Systems:Combining Theoretical Principles and Practical Trade'-offs," Quaderni DISA 047, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 29 Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alessandro Rossi & Massimo Warglien, 2000. "An Experimental Investigation of Fairness and Reciprocal Behavior in a Simple Principal-Multiagent Relationship (Updated version of the older "Fairness in Hierarchical Triangles: an Experimental ," ROCK Working Papers 009, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.