Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines
AbstractWe investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal equilibria, in which agents condition only on how their signals rank their actions and not on signal strength, lead to simple patterns of behavior that have a natural interpretation as routines. These routine spartially solve the teamâ€™s coordination problem by synchronizing the teamâ€™s search efforts and prove to be resilient to changes in the environment by being expost equilibria, to agents having only a coarse understanding of other agentsâ€™ strategies by being fully cursed, and to natural forms of agentsâ€™ overcon?dence. The price of this resilience is that optimal routines are frequently not optimal equilibria.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 355.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Andreas Blume & April M. Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2011. "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-11-10, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
- Andreas Blume, 2011. "Dynamic Coordination Via Organizational Routines," Working Papers 439, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
- Heidhues, Paul & Blume, Andreas & Franco, April, 2013. "Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80027, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jacques Crémer & Luis Garicano & Andrea Prat, 2007.
"Language and the Theory of the Firm,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 373-407, 02.
- Andreas Blume & John Duffy, 2004. "Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation," 2004 Meeting Papers 617, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Robert S. Gibbons, 2010.
"Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000249, David K. Levine.
- Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 337-365, 09.
- GOSSNER, Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998.
"Strategic learning in games with symmetric information,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-47, January.
- O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
- Andreas Blume & John Duffy & April M. Franco, 2009.
"Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1178-1205, September.
- Andreas Blume & John Duffy & April Mitchell Franco, 2008. "Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 382, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2009.
- John Duffy & Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2007. "Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 310, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
- Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-65, March.
- David A. Miller, 2012.
"Robust Collusion with Private Information,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
- David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, EconWPA.
- Jehiel, Philippe, 2005.
"Analogy-based expectation equilibrium,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
- Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006.
"Private monitoring in auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
- Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, 03.
- Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.