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Optimal formation rules for patent pools

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Author Info
Steffen Brenner ()
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-008-0379-z
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 40 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 373-388
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:40:y:2009:i:3:p:373-388

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Related research
Keywords: R&; D cooperation; Endogenous coalition formation; Optimal coalitions; Antitrust; Patent thicket; K11; L41; M2;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rabah Amir, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1475, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jay Pil Choi, 2009. "Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-044, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Sang-Seung Yi, 1998. "Endogenous Formation of Joint Ventures with Efficiency Gains," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 610-631, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Yair Tauman & Naoki Watanabe, 2007. "The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 135-149, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-22.


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