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Endogenous Formation of Joint Ventures with Efficiency Gains

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Sang-Seung Yi

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Abstract

I study stable structures of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures among symmetric firms. Efficiency gains that accrue to a joint venture are assumed to increase with its size. The socially efficient industrywide joint venture is the stable outcome when membership of a joint venture is open to outside firms, but typically not when membership can be restricted. Members of a large joint venture want to restrict membership for strategic reasons -- e.g., in order to keep rival firms' costs high. Side payments among firms do not eliminate the strategic incentives of members of a large joint venture to limit membership

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 610-631
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:autumn:p:610-631

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  1. Frédéric DEROÏAN, 2004. "A Note on Cost-Reducing Alliances in Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(11), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gamal Atallah, 2003. "Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 531-554, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. S. Goyal & J.L. Moraga, 2000. "R&D Networks," Econometric Institute Report 202, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Raff, Horst & Ryan, Michael & Stähler, Frank, 2005. "Asset Ownership and Foreign-Market Entry," Economics Working Papers 2006,01, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-24, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  6. Frédéric Deroian, 2005. "Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers," Working Papers 2005.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-54, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Patrick Greenlee & Bruno Cassiman, 1999. "Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 115-130.
  9. S. Goyal & S. Joshi, 1999. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Econometric Institute Report 175, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Steffen Brenner, 2009. "Optimal formation rules for patent pools," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 373-388, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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