Endogenous Formation of Joint Ventures with Efficiency Gains
AbstractI study stable structures of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures among symmetric firms. Efficiency gains that accrue to a joint venture are assumed to increase with its size. The socially efficient industrywide joint venture is the stable outcome when membership of a joint venture is open to outside firms, but typically not when membership can be restricted. Members of a large joint venture want to restrict membership for strategic reasons -- e.g., in order to keep rival firms' costs high. Side payments among firms do not eliminate the strategic incentives of members of a large joint venture to limit membership
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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