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Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

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  • Jay Pil Choi

Abstract

Most patent pools are formed in the shadow of patent litigation as an attempt to settle disputes in regard to conflicting infringement claims and the validity of patents. To reflect this reality, I develop a simple framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty as to the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. I analyze private incentives to litigate and compare them with the social incentives. Antitrust implications of patent pools are considered. The effects of patent pools on third party incentives to challenge the validity of patents and on development incentives are also investigated.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1070.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1070

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Keywords: patent pools; cross-licensing; complements and substitutes; patent litigation;

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References

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  1. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
  2. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-51, Spring.
  3. Shapiro, Carl, 2001. "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt87s5j911, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
  5. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole & Marcin Strojwas, 2003. "Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools," NBER Working Papers 9680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. O'DONOGHUE, Ted & SCOTCHMER, Suzanne & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Patent breadth, patent life, and the pace of technological progress," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1314, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Carl Shapiro, 2004. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000539, David K. Levine.
  8. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
  10. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
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Cited by:
  1. Joachim Henkel & Stefanie Pangerl, 2008. "Defensive Publishing An Empirical Study," DRUID Working Papers 08-04, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  2. Blandine Laperche, 2005. "How do firms protect their “knowledge capital”? socialization versus appropriation (Comment les firmes protègent-elles leur “capital savoir”? socialisation versus appropriation)," Working Papers 104, Laboratoire de Recherche sur l'Industrie et l'Innovation. ULCO / Research Unit on Industry and Innovation.
  3. Steffen Brenner, 2009. "Optimal formation rules for patent pools," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 373-388, September.
  4. Alberto Galasso, 2007. "Broad Cross-License Agreements andPersuasive Patent Litigation: Theory andEvidence from the Semiconductor Industry," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 45, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  5. Katharine Rockett, 2009. "Property Rights and Invention," Economics Discussion Papers 663, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  6. Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "Economics and the design of patent systems," Working Papers 07-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  7. Robert M. Hunt, 2006. "When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 87-91, May.

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