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Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

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Author Info
Jay Pil Choi ()

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Abstract

Most patent pools are formed in the shadow of patent litigation as an attempt to settle disputes in regard to conflicting infringement claims and the validity of patents. To reflect this reality, I develop a simple framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty as to the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. I analyze private incentives to litigate and compare them with the social incentives. Antitrust implications of patent pools are considered. The effects of patent pools on third party incentives to challenge the validity of patents and on development incentives are also investigated.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1070.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1070

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Related research
Keywords: patent pools; cross-licensing; complements and substitutes; patent litigation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-51, Spring.
  2. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Efficient Patent Pools," NBER Working Papers 9175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements," Law and Economics 0303004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Ted O'Donoghue & Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, 1998. "Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. David M. Cutler & Elizabeth Richardson, 1997. "Measuring the Health of the U.S. Population," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(1997-1), pages 217-282. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
  13. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert M. Hunt, 2006. "When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001065, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "Economics and the design of patent systems," Working Papers 07-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alberto Galasso, 2007. "Broad Cross-License Agreements andPersuasive Patent Litigation: Theory andEvidence from the Semiconductor Industry," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 45, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Joachim Henkel & Stefanie Pangerl, 2008. "Defensive Publishing An Empirical Study," DRUID Working Papers 08-04, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  5. Patrick Gaulé, 2006. "Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?," CEMI Working Papers cemi-report-2006-010, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship Institute, Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation. [Downloadable!]
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