Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation
AbstractWe present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 856.10.
Date of creation: 25 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Sequential Innovation; Patent Policy; Patent Pools; Anticommons; Double Marginalization; Complementary Monopoly;
Other versions of this item:
- Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2012. "Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 703-725, August.
- Gaston Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2009. "Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation," Harvard Business School Working Papers 10-005, Harvard Business School.
- Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2010. "Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation," Working Papers 523, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2010-12-04 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2010-12-04 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2010-12-04 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-TID-2010-12-04 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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- Thomas D. Jeitschko & Nanyun Zhang, 2012.
"Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization,"
EAG Discussions Papers
201205, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Zhang, Nanyun, 2013. "Adverse effects of patent pooling on product development and commercialization," DICE Discussion Papers 92, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4429, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2012. "The case against patents," Working Papers 2012-035, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2012. "The Case Against Patents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000465, David K. Levine.
- Takashi Kamihigashi, 2013. "An Order-Theoretic Approach to Dynamic Programming: An Exposition," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-29, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
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