Anticommons and optimal patent policy in a model of sequential innovation
AbstractWhen innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we076838.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Llanes Gastón & Trento Stefano, 2011. "Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-27, August.
- Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2009. "Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation," Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School 09-148, Harvard Business School.
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2007-10-20 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2007-10-20 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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- Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2010.
"Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC)
856.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2012. "Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 703-725, August.
- Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2010. "Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation," Working Papers 523, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Gaston Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2009. "Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation," Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School 10-005, Harvard Business School.
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