Intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model with persistent leadership
AbstractThis article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics - University of Zurich in its series ECON - Working Papers with number 078.
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Intellectual property rights; persistent leadership; cumulative innovation; preemption; forward protection; non-obviousness requirement; patent policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-06-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2012-06-13 (Innovation)
- NEP-TID-2012-06-13 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Angus Chu, 2009. "Effects of blocking patents on R&D: a quantitative DGE analysis," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-78, March.
- Kiedaisch, Christian & Grafenhofer, Dominik, 2013. "Taste for Exclusivity and Intellectual Property Rights," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80017, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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