This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Antoine Martin ()
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 197-211
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:1:p:197-211Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).
Keywords: Bank panics ; Liquidity provision ; Deposit insurance ; Moral hazard. ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Haubrich, Joseph G. & King, Robert G., 1990.
"Banking and insurance ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 361-386, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: John H. Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce D. Smith, 1998.
"Deposit insurance: a reconsideration ,"
Working Papers
593, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1976.
"Optimal Financial Crises ,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
97-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 1984.
"Banking Panics ,"
Discussion Papers
618, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
John Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce Smith, 2004.
"Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 741-767, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Neil Wallace, 1988.
"Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously ,"
Quarterly Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-16.
[Downloadable!]
Rafael Repullo, 2000.
"Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model ,"
Proceedings ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
Other versions:
Repullo, R., 1999.
"Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model ,"
Papers
9913, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
Repullo, Rafael, 2000.
"Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model ,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 580-605, August.
Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996.
"Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence ,"
Canadian Journal of Economics ,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Champ, B. & Smith, B.D., 1991.
"Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: theory and Evidence ,"
University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers
9109, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
Champ, B. & Snith, B.D. & Williamson, D.S., 1991.
"Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence ,"
RCER Working Papers
292, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
Calomiris, Charles W., 1999.
"Building an incentive-compatible safety net ,"
Journal of Banking & Finance ,
Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998.
"Financial Contagion Journal of Political Economy ,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
98-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]
Freeman, Scott, 1988.
"Banking as the Provision of Liquidity ,"
Journal of Business ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 45-64, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stephen D. Williamson, 1998.
"Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 246-275, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988.
"Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-92, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978.
"Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition ,"
Journal of Business ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-38, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Denise Hazlett, 1997.
"Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology (*) ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 453-470.
Lucas, Robert E, Jr & Stokey, Nancy L, 1987.
"Money and Interest in a Cash-in-Advance Economy ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 491-513, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity ,"
Quarterly Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983.
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Neil Wallace, 1990.
"A banking model in which partial suspension is best ,"
Quarterly Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 11-23.
[Downloadable!]
von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1999.
"Liquidity creation through banks and markets: Multiple insurance and limited market access ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 991-1006, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sleet, Christopher & Smith, Bruce D, 2000.
"Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions ,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 518-75, August.
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Antoine Martin, 2008.
"Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11 ,"
Staff Reports
217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
[Downloadable!]
David R. Skeie, 2008.
"Banking with nominal deposits and inside money ,"
Staff Reports
242, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2009.
"Bank liquidity, interbank markets, and monetary policy ,"
Staff Reports
371, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
[Downloadable!]
Antoine Martin, 2002.
"Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to Sept. 11 ,"
Research Working Paper
RWP 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
[Downloadable!]
Rubén Hernández-Murillo, 2007.
"Experiments in financial liberalization: the Mexican banking sector ,"
Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 415-432.
[Downloadable!]
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2003.
"Financial Intermediaries and Markets ,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
00-44, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".
This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .