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Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance

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Author Info
Stephen D. Williamson (Department of Economics, University of Iowa)

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Abstract

A banking model is constructed where roles for government-provided deposit insurance and discount window lending arise when there are restrictions on branch banking. Banks arise endogenously as an efficient arrangement for sharing risk. Discount window lending permits better risk-sharing by making bank assets more liquid, but is limited because of a moral hazard problem which arises from adverse selection in the loan market. Deposit insurance also creates the potential for better risk-sharing, but accomplishes this through contingent transfers rather than enhancing liquidity. Banks tend to take on more risk with deposit insurance and to take less care in screening loans, but this is consistent with an increase in welfare for depositors and borrowers. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.1997.0002
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 1 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 246-275
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:246-275

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Champ, B. & Smith, B.D., 1991. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: theory and Evidence," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9109, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
    Other versions:
  2. Mitsui, Toshihide & Watanabe, Shinichi, 1989. "Monetary growth in a turnpike environment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 123-137, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Townsend, Robert M, 1987. "Economic Organization with Limited Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 954-71, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1993. "U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 4404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. John H. Boyd & Arthur J. Rolnick, 1988. "A case for reforming federal deposit insurance," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1993. "Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening," Finance 9310001, EconWPA, revised 02 Nov 1993. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hornstein, Andreas & Krusell, Per, 1993. "Money and Insurance in a Turnpike Environment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 19-34, January.
  8. Stephen D. Williamson, 1989. "Restrictions on financial intermediaries and implications for aggregate fluctuations: Canada and the United States, 1870-1913," Staff Report 119, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  9. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  10. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Debt Contracts with Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 573-595, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-16. [Downloadable!]
  13. English, William B., 1993. "The decline of private deposit insurance in the United States," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 57-128, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Antoine Martin, 2001. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance : preventing bank panics without moral hazard?," Research Working Paper RWP 01-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Antoine Martin, 2008. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11," Staff Reports 217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  3. Michael Loewy, 2003. "``To Furnish an Elastic Currency'': Banking, Aggregate Risk, and Welfare," Topics in Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1052-1052. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bruce D. Smith & Cheng Wang, 1997. "Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance," Working Papers 574, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Antoine Martin, 2002. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to Sept. 11," Research Working Paper RWP 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gaetano Antinolfi & Todd Keister, 2003. "Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," Working Papers 0305, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Gaetano Antinolfi & Todd Keister, 2000. "Liquidity Crises and Discount Window Lending: Theory and Implications for the Dollarization Debate," Working Papers 0002, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gaetano Antinolfi & Elisabeth Huybens & Todd Keister, 2000. "Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the Lender of Last Resort," Working Papers 0001, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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