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Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, And Indeterminacy Of Equilibrium

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  • ANTINOLFI, GAETANO
  • KEISTER, TODD

Abstract

We study how discount window policy affects the frequency of banking crises, the level of investment, and the scope for indeterminacy of equilibrium. Previous work has shown that providing costless liquidity through a discount window has mixed effects in terms of these criteria: It prevents episodes of high liquidity demand from causing crises but can lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium and to inefficiently low levels of investment. We show how offering discount window loans at an above-market interest rate can be unambiguously beneficial. Such a policy generates a unique stationary equilibrium. Banking crises occur with positive probability in this equilibrium and the level of investment is suboptimal, but a proper combination of discount window and monetary policies can make the welfare effects of these inefficiencies arbitrarily small. The near-optimal policies can be viewed as approximately implementing the Friedman rule.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Macroeconomic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 01 (February)
Pages: 1-19

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Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:10:y:2006:i:01:p:1-19_05

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  1. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November.
  2. Stacey L. Schreft & Bruce D. Smith, 2001. "The conduct of monetary policy with a shrinking stock of government debt," Research Working Paper RWP 01-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  3. Gaetano Antinolfi & Elisabeth Huybens, 2000. "Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the Lender of Last Resort," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1156, Econometric Society.
  4. Bruce D. Smith, 2002. "Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 128-134, May.
  5. John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce David Smith, 2014. "A User's Guide to Banking Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 800-892, November.
  6. Gale, David, 1973. "Pure exchange equilibrium of dynamic economic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 12-36, February.
  7. Townsend, Robert M, 1987. "Economic Organization with Limited Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 954-71, December.
  8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  9. Williamson, S.D., 1995. "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Working Papers 95-01, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  10. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2003. "Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 220-245, April.
  11. Freeman, Scott, 1999. "Rediscounting under aggregate risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 197-216, February.
  12. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
  13. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1982. "The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1212-36, December.
  14. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-38, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2012. "Imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 1673-1687.
  2. Tarishi Matsuoka, 2011. "Temporary Bubbles and Discount Window Policy," KIER Working Papers 802, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H. & Martin, Antoine, 2009. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1236-1246, June.
  4. Carlos Gustavo Machicado, 2006. "Liquidity Shocks and the Dollarization of a Banking System," Development Research Working Paper Series 09/2006, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
  5. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2008. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1273-1311, April.
  6. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2006. "On the Usefulness of the Constrained Planning Problem in a Model of Money," Staff General Research Papers 12660, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Edgar A. Ghossoub & Robert Reed, . "Liquidity Risk, Economic Development, and the Effects of Monetary Policy," Working Papers 0070, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
  8. Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2005. "Optimality of the Friedman rule in an overlapping generations model with spatial separation," Staff Reports 225, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  9. Joseph H. Haslag & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Money, output and the payment system: Optimal monetary policy in a model with hidden effort," Working Papers 0704, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  10. Todd Keister, 2009. "Central Bank Lending and Inflation," 2009 Meeting Papers 782, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2005. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments in an Economy with Real and Liquidity Shocks," Staff General Research Papers 12355, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2010. "Optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1277-1294, July.

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