Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gaetano Antinolfi

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Washington University)

  • Todd Keister

    ()
    (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))

Abstract

We examine optimal discount window policy in an economy with a linear investment technology and aggregate liquidity shocks. Unrestricted lending at the discount window prevents large shocks from causing banking crises, but leads to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium. We show how a policy of offering discount-window loans at an above-market interest rate generates a unique stationary monetary equilibrium. Under such a policy, banking crises occur with positive probability in equilibrium, but a proper choice of interest rate can make the welfare loss due to these crises arbitrarily small. We then modify the model by introducing diminishing returns to investment and show that, in this case, the optimal policy may eliminate banking crises entirely.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/keister/03-05.pdf
File Function: First version, 2003
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 0305.

as in new window
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:0305

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Camino a Sta. Teresa 930, Mexico, D.F. 10700
Phone: +525 628 4197
Fax: +525 628 4058
Email:
Web page: http://cie.itam.mx/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Huybens, Elisabeth & Keister, Todd, 2001. "Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 187-219, July.
  2. Champ, B. & Smith, B.D., 1991. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: theory and Evidence," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9109, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
  3. Schreft, Stacey L & Smith, Bruce D, 2002. "The Conduct of Monetary Policy with a Shrinking Stock of Government Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(3), pages 848-82, August.
  4. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  5. Gale, David, 1973. "Pure exchange equilibrium of dynamic economic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 12-36, February.
  6. John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce David Smith, 2014. "A User's Guide to Banking Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 800-892, November.
  7. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2003. "Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 220-245, April.
  8. Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Discount Window Lending and Deposit Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 246-275, January.
  9. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1982. "The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1212-36, December.
  10. Bruce D. Smith, 2002. "Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 128-134, May.
  11. Townsend, Robert M, 1987. "Economic Organization with Limited Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 954-71, December.
  12. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-38, December.
  13. Freeman, Scott, 1999. "Rediscounting under aggregate risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 197-216, February.
  14. Peck, James & Shell, Karl, 2001. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Working Papers 01-10r, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tarishi Matsuoka, 2011. "Temporary Bubbles and Discount Window Policy," KIER Working Papers 802, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Joseph H. Haslag & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Money, output and the payment system: Optimal monetary policy in a model with hidden effort," Working Papers 0704, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  3. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2006. "On the Usefulness of the Constrained Planning Problem in a Model of Money," Staff General Research Papers 12660, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph & Martin, Antoine, 2007. "Why Does Overnight Liquidity Cost More Than Intraday Liquidity?," Staff General Research Papers 13096, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2005. "Optimality of the Friedman rule in an overlapping generations model with spatial separation," Staff Reports 225, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  6. Carlos Gustavo Machicado, 2006. "Liquidity Shocks and the Dollarization of a Banking System," Development Research Working Paper Series 09/2006, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
  7. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2010. "Optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1277-1294, July.
  8. Todd Keister, 2009. "Central Bank Lending and Inflation," 2009 Meeting Papers 782, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Ghossoub, Edgar & Reed III, Robert R., 2010. "Liquidity risk, economic development, and the effects of monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 252-268, February.
  10. Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2012. "Imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 1673-1687.
  11. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2008. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1273-1311, April.
  12. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh, 2005. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments in an Economy with Real and Liquidity Shocks," Staff General Research Papers 12355, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:0305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diego Dominguez).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.