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Incentives in primary care and their impact on potentially avoidable hospital admissions

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Author Info

  • Gianluca Fiorentini
  • Elisa Iezzi
  • Matteo Lippi Bruni

    ()

  • Cristina Ugolini

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10198-010-0230-x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal The European Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 297-309

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Handle: RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:12:y:2011:i:4:p:297-309

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10198/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Primary care; Preventable hospitalisation; Financial incentive; Organizational appropriateness; Multilevel modelling; I11; I18; C31;

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References

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  1. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough Or Don'T Pay At All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810, August.
  2. W. J. Browne & S. V. Subramanian & K. Jones & H. Goldstein, 2005. "Variance partitioning in multilevel logistic models that exhibit overdispersion," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 168(3), pages 599-613.
  3. Iversen, Tor & Luras, Hilde, 2000. "Economic motives and professional norms: the case of general medical practice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 447-470, December.
  4. Anthony Scott & Stefanie Schurer & Paul H. Jensen & Peter Sivey, 2008. "The Effect of Financial Incentives on Quality of Care: The Case of Diabetes," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2008n12, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
  5. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
  6. George France & Francesco Taroni & Andrea Donatini, 2005. "The Italian health-care system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(S1), pages S187-S202.
  7. Greir Godager & Tor Iversen & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2007. "Service Motives And Profit Incentives Among Physicians," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-042, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2007.
  8. David Cutler, 2006. "The Economics of Health System Payment," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 1-18, 03.
  9. Maria Goddard & Russell Mannion & Peter Smith, 2000. "Enhancing performance in health care: a theoretical perspective on agency and the role of information," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(2), pages 95-107.
  10. Victor Lavy, 2009. "Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1979-2011, December.
  11. Nigel Rice & Andrew Jones, 1997. "Multilevel models and health economics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(6), pages 561-575.
  12. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
  14. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  15. P.C. Smith, 2002. "Measuring health system performance," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 145-148, September.
  16. Lippi Bruni, Matteo & Nobilio, Lucia & Ugolini, Cristina, 2009. "Economic incentives in general practice: The impact of pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs on diabetes care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 90(2-3), pages 140-148, May.
  17. James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith & Christopher Taber, 1996. "What Do Bureaucrats Do? The Effects of Performance Standards and Bureaucratic Preferences on Acceptance into the JTPA Program," NBER Working Papers 5535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mark Dusheiko & Hugh Gravelle & Stephen Martin & Nigel Rice & Peter C Smith, 2011. "Does Better Disease Management in Primary Care Reduce Hospital Costs?," Working Papers 065cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
  2. Visca, Modesta & Donatini, Andrea & Gini, Rosa & Federico, Bruno & Damiani, Gianfranco & Francesconi, Paolo & Grilli, Leonardo & Rampichini, Carla & Lapini, Gabriele & Zocchetti, Carlo & Di Stanislao,, 2013. "Group versus single handed primary care: A performance evaluation of the care delivered to chronic patients by Italian GPs," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 188-198.
  3. Iezzi, Elisa & Lippi Bruni, Matteo & Ugolini, Cristina, 2014. "The role of GP's compensation schemes in diabetes care: Evidence from panel data," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 104-120.
  4. Donatini A. & Fiorentini G. & Lippi Bruni M. & Mammi I. & Ugolini C., 2014. "Dealing with minor illnesses: the link between primary care characteristics and First Aid Clinics’ attendances," Working Papers wp925, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. G. Fiorentini & M. Lippi Bruni & C. Ugolini, 2012. "GPs and hospital expenditures. Should we keep expenditure containment programs alive?," Working Papers wp829, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. Mark Dusheiko & Hugh Gravelle & Stephen Martin & Nigel Rice & Peter Smith, . "Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs? Evidence from English primary care," Discussion Papers 11/15, Department of Economics, University of York.

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