Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Enhancing performance in health care: a theoretical perspective on agency and the role of information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Maria Goddard

    (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, UK)

  • Russell Mannion

    (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, UK)

  • Peter Smith

Abstract

This paper examines the role of information in securing control of health care systems. The discussion focuses on the impact of the proposed 'Performance Framework', which entails a significant increase in the importance attached to formal performance indicators in the management of the UK National Health Service. The paper starts with a discussion of the role of performance data in securing organizational control within health care systems and summarizes recent research into the behavioural consequences of seeking to control health care agents using such information. A theoretical principal|agent model is then used to illustrate the incentives that exist for dysfunctional behaviour within health care when only imperfect information systems are available. The theoretical results are then examined in the context of a qualitative empirical study, which elicited the perceptions of managers and health care professionals connected with eight NHS hospitals. The study confirmed the existence and importance of serious dysfunctional consequences arising from the use of information as a means of control, and concludes that the Performance Framework will be successful only if it is used in careful conjunction with other means of control. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 95-107

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:9:y:2000:i:2:p:95-107

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  2. Darvish, Tikva & Kahana, Nava, 1989. "The ratchet principle : A multi-period flexible incentive scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 51-57, January.
  3. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766.
  4. William G. Ouchi, 1979. "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 833-848, September.
  5. Maria Goddard & Russell Mannion, 1998. "From competition to co-operation: new economic relationships in the National Health Service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 105-119.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "To Serve The Community Or Oneself: The Public Servant'S Dilemma," Development and Comp Systems 0409035, EconWPA.
  2. Rud Kristensen, Søren & Siciliani, Luigi & Sutton, Matt, 2014. "Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care," CEPR Discussion Papers 9915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Antti Peltokorpi, 2011. "How do strategic decisions and operative practices affect operating room productivity?," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 370-382, November.
  4. G. Fiorentini & E. Iezzi & M. Lippi Bruni & C. Ugolini, 2009. "Incentives In Primary Care and Their Impact on Potentially Avoidable Hospital Admissions," Working Papers 660, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, 2004. "Making Government Accountable: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program," Discussion Papers 04-03, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  6. Iezzi, Elisa & Lippi Bruni, Matteo & Ugolini, Cristina, 2014. "The role of GP's compensation schemes in diabetes care: Evidence from panel data," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 104-120.
  7. Ssengooba, Freddie & McPake, Barbara & Palmer, Natasha, 2012. "Why performance-based contracting failed in Uganda – An “open-box” evaluation of a complex health system intervention," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 377-383.
  8. Joanna Coast, 2001. "Citizens, their agents and health care rationing: an exploratory study using qualitative methods," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(2), pages 159-174.
  9. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:9:y:2000:i:2:p:95-107. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.