Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Economic Incentives in General Practice: the Impact of Pay for Participation Programs on Diabetes Care

Contents:

Author Info

  • M. Lippi Bruni
  • L. Nobilio
  • C. Ugolini

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/wp/607.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 607.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:607

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Scott, Anthony & Shiell, Alan, 1997. "Do fee descriptors influence treatment choices in general practice? A multilevel discrete choice model," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 323-342, June.
  2. Whynes, David K. & Baines, Darrin L., 1998. "Income-based incentives in UK general practice," Health Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 15-31, January.
  3. Hugh Gravelle & Giuliano Masiero, . "Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs: capitation in general practice," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 00/18, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  5. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Scott, Anthony & Hall, Jane, 1995. "Evaluating the effects of GP remuneration: problems and prospects," Health Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 183-195, March.
  7. Mooney, Gavin & Ryan, Mandy, 1993. "Agency in health care: Getting beyond first principles," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-135, July.
  8. W. J. Browne & S. V. Subramanian & K. Jones & H. Goldstein, 2005. "Variance partitioning in multilevel logistic models that exhibit overdispersion," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 168(3), pages 599-613.
  9. Eggleston, Karen, 2005. "Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 211-223, January.
  10. Nancy Beaulieu & David M. Cutler & Katherine Ho, 2006. "The Business Case for Diabetes Disease Management for Managed Care Organizations," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 9 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Nigel Rice & Andrew Jones, 1997. "Multilevel models and health economics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(6), pages 561-575.
  12. Davis, Peter & Gribben, Barry & Scott, Alastair & Lay-Yee, Roy, 2000. "The "supply hypothesis" and medical practice variation in primary care: testing economic and clinical models of inter-practitioner variation," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 407-418, February.
  13. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  14. Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June.
  15. Hughes, David & Yule, Brian, 1992. "The effect of per-item fees on the behaviour of general practitioners," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 413-437, December.
  16. Grytten, Jostein & Sorensen, Rune, 2003. "Practice variation and physician-specific effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 403-418, May.
  17. Frey, Bruno S., 1993. "Shirking or work morale? : The impact of regulating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1523-1532, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Scott, A & Schurer, S & Jensen, P H & Sivey, P, 2008. "The Effects of Financial Incentives on Quality of Care: The Case of Diabetes," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York 08/15, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Kim Olsen & Dorte Gyrd-Hansen & Torben Sørensen & Troels Kristensen & Peter Vedsted & Andrew Street, 2013. "Organisational determinants of production and efficiency in general practice: a population-based study," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 267-276, April.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:607. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.