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Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs: capitation in general practice

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Author Info
Gravelle, Hugh
Masiero, Giuliano

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2000)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1067-1088
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:19:y:2000:i:6:p:1067-1088

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Klemperer, Paul, 1995. "Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(4), pages 515-39, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paul Klemperer, 1987. "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 138-150, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Helmut Bester, 1998. "Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 828-844, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Economides, Nicholas, 1993. "Quality variations in the circular model of variety-differentiated products," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 235-257, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Schmalensee, Richard, 1982. "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 349-65, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Wolinsky, Asher, 1984. "Product Differentiation with Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 53-61, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Tore Nilssen, 1992. "Two Kinds of Consumer Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 579-589, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michele Moretto & Rosella Levaggi, 2004. "Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach," Working Papers 2004.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yasuo Sanjo, 2009. "Quality choice in a health care market: a mixed duopoly approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 207-215, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. M. Lippi Bruni & L. Nobilio & C. Ugolini, 2007. "Economic Incentives in General Practice: the Impact of Pay for Participation Programs on Diabetes Care," Working Papers 607, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  4. Massimo Filippini & Giuliano Masiero & Karine Moschetti, 2008. "Dispensing practices and antibiotic use," Quaderni della facoltà di Scienze economiche dell'Università di Lugano 0808, Biblioteca universitaria di Lugano (University Library of Lugano). [Downloadable!]
  5. Yasuo Sanjo, 2007. "Hotelling's Location Model with Quality Choice in Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 18(2), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
  6. Giuliano Masiero & Hugh Gravelle, 2000. "Quality incentives under a capitation regime: the role of patient expectations," Departemental Working Papers 2000-07, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kurt R. Brekke & Robert Nuscheler & Odd Rune Straume, 2005. "Gatekeeping in Health Care," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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