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Нестабильность Демократии В Странах, Богатых Ресурсами

Author

Listed:
  • Полтерович В. М.

    (РАН; РЭШ, ЦЭМИ)

  • Попов В. В.

    (РЭШ, АНХ)

  • Тонис А. С.

    (РЭШ)

Abstract

В работе проведен анализ данных об устойчивости демократических режимов в странах, богатых природными ресурсами, и предложена модель, объясняющая, почему в одних странах изобилие природных ресурсов может привести к нестабильности демократии, а в других не создает никаких трудностей для демократической системы. Центральная идея работы следующая. Если страна богата точечными природными ресурсами, то создаются предпосылки для получения их владельцами доминирующей экономической власти. Если к тому же в стране слабые институты, то экономическая власть может стать и политической. Владельцы ресурсов (олигархи) могут, подкупая политиков, проталкивать через парламент выгодные для себя решения. Несовершенство демократии создает основу для действий потенциального Автократа, стремящегося к власти. В предлагаемой здесь простой модели рассматривается единственный инструмент экономической политики ставка налога на ресурсную ренту. Этот налог влияет на доход репрезентативного избирателя. Объявляя ставку налога, Автократ конкурирует за власть с действующим Политиком (репрезентативной политической партией). Модель показывает существование порогового уровня склонности к коррупции (рассматриваемого как мера качества институтов). При большой склонности к коррупции вероятность сохранения демократии отрицательно зависит от количества ресурсов, тогда как при малой склонности проявляется отсутствие зависимости или даже положительная зависимость от ресурсов. Показано также, что Автократ может применять политику двух типов, в зависимости от качества управления (способности распределять собранные налоги без больших потерь), ожидаемого избирателями от него и Политика. Более эффективный Автократ склонен к популистской политике с высокой ставкой налога на ресурсную ренту, а меньшая эффективность Автократа в сочетании с изобилием природных ресурсов приводит к выгодной для олигархов политике с низкой ставкой налога.

Suggested Citation

  • Полтерович В. М. & Попов В. В. & Тонис А. С., 2008. "Нестабильность Демократии В Странах, Богатых Ресурсами," Higher School of Economics Economic Journal Экономический журнал Высшей школы экономики, CyberLeninka;Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», vol. 12(2), pages 176-200.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:025886:15693486
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    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander, 2010. "Subnational resource curse: do economic or political institutions matter?," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 154, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    2. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Экономический Кризис И Новая Парадигма Общественной Поддержки Опекаемых Благ [Economic Crisis and the New Paradigm of Public Support of the Patronized Goods]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2015:2, Institute of Economics.
    3. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Методологический Анализ Теории Опекаемых Благ: Научный Доклад [methodological analysis of the Theory of Patronized Goods. Research report]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2014:1, Institute of Economics.
    4. N. N. Mikheeva, 2018. "Factors of Growth in Russian Regions: Adapting to New Realities," Regional Research of Russia, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 334-344, October.
    5. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Элементы Общей Теории Изъянов Смешанной Экономики [Elements of the general theory of the mixed economy defects]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2017:3, Institute of Economics.
    6. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Введение В Общую Теорию Изъянов Смешанной Экономики [Introduction to the general theory of defects of the mixed economy]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2016:3, Institute of Economics.
    7. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Теория Опекаемых Благ И Патернализм В Экономических Теориях: Общее И Особенное [The Theory of Patronized Goods and the Paternalism in Economic Theories: General and Special]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2015:1, Institute of Economics.
    8. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич & Городецкий Андрей Евгеньевич, "undated". "Некоторые Аспекты Экономической Теории Государства. Научный Доклад [Some aspects of the economic theory of the state. Scientific report]," Working papers a:pru175:a:pgo471:ye:2017, Institute of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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