IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rje/randje/v30y1999ispringp44-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rationing in a Durable Goods Monopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Vincenzo Denicolo'
  • Paolo Garella

Abstract

We offer a new explanation of equilibrium rationing. As is well known, a monopolist selling a durable good and not able to commit to a price sequence has an incentive to lower the price once the consumers with the greatest willingness to pay have bought, but this induces consumers to postpone purchases. We show that rationing reduces the incentive to lower future prices and may allow the monopolist to increase his discounted profit.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo Denicolo' & Paolo Garella, 1999. "Rationing in a Durable Goods Monopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 44-55, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:spring:p:44-55
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199921%2930%3A1%3C44%3ARIADGM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2002. "Rationing as a Signal," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 1(2), pages 115-122, August.
    2. John Boyce & Jeffrey Robert Church & Lucia Vojtassak, "undated". "Capacity Constraints in Durable Goods Monopoly: Coase and Hotelling," Working Papers 2012-07, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 08 Aug 2012.
    3. Hu, Shu & Zhu, Stuart X. & Fu, Ke, 2023. "Optimal trade-in and refurbishment strategies for durable goods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(1), pages 133-151.
    4. Pascal Courty & Javad Nasiry, 2016. "Product Launches and Buying Frenzies: A Dynamic Perspective," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 25(1), pages 143-152, January.
    5. Preyas S. Desai & Oded Koenigsberg & Devavrat Purohit, 2007. "Research Note--The Role of Production Lead Time and Demand Uncertainty in Marketing Durable Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(1), pages 150-158, January.
    6. Paulo Macas Nunes, 2006. "The Coase problem: a transformation of the usual utility function," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(7), pages 427-429.
    7. Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 2011. "Optimal best-price policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 628-643, September.
    8. Qian Liu & Garrett J. van Ryzin, 2008. "Strategic Capacity Rationing to Induce Early Purchases," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(6), pages 1115-1131, June.
    9. Liu, Ting & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2014. "Buying frenzies in durable-goods markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-16.
    10. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2021. "Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 310-328.
    11. Paulo Maçãs Nunes, 2015. "Pricing Strategy In The Context Of Durable Goods Monopoly With Discrete Demand," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 60(204), pages 61-74, January –.
    12. Garella, Paolo G., 2002. "Price discrimination and the location choice of a durable goods monopoly," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 765-773, November.
    13. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2023. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 158-176, January.
    14. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 0. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    15. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
    16. Luca Lambertini & Raimondello Orsini, 2007. "Network externalities in a dynamic monopoly," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 15(1), pages 105-117, March.
    17. Volker Nocke & Martin Peitz, 2003. "Monopoly Pricing under Demand Uncertainty: Final Sales versus Introductory ffers," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:spring:p:44-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.rje.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.