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¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?

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Author Info
Boris Salazar () (Universidad del Valle)
Abstract

This paper shows the relevance of Popper's Rationality Principle (RP) for the appraisal of the impressive mass work emerging, in recent years, in the fields of rationality, learning, evolutionary games and behavioral economic theory. In contradistinction to the well-known rigid criteria of the falsacionist Popper, the RP covers a large and diverse spectrum of behaviors compatible with the minimal idea of ‘acting in accordance with the situation’. Its relevance to understand the formation of social conventions or how agents learn ‘to play Nash equilibrium’ is argued at length here.

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File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/bsalazar5.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 (July-December)
Pages: 52-77
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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:3:y:2001:i:5:p:52-77

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Related research
Keywords: rationality economic methodology evolutionary games social conventions Nash equilibrium

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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  1. Camerer, Colin, . "Progress and Behavioral Game Theory," Working Papers 1004, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 423-432. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16, January.
  7. repec:att:wimass:199529 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Camerer, Colin F, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-88, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Borgers, Tilman, 1996. "On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1374-85, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series 26, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  11. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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