Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection

Contents:

Author Info

  • Binmore, Ken

    (Department of Economics, University College London)

  • Samuelson, Larry

    (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash equilibria that specify the same behavior on the equilibrium path, but different out-of-equilibrium behavior, appear in connected components of stationary states. The stability properties of these components often depend critically on the perturbations to which the system is subjected. We argue that it is then important to incorporate such drift into the model. A sufficient condition is provided for drift to create stationary states with strong stability properties near a component of equilibria. This result is used to derive comparative static predictions concerning common questions raised in the literature on refinements of Nash equlibrium.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-26.pdf
    File Function: First version, 1996
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number 26.

    as in new window
    Length: 42 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 1996
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:26

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria
    Phone: ++43 - (0)1 - 599 91 - 0
    Fax: ++43 - (0)1 - 599 91 - 555
    Web page: http://www.ihs.ac.at
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Postal: Institute for Advanced Studies - Library, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria

    Related research

    Keywords: Evolutionary Games; Cheap Talk; Stability Drift;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Antonio Cabrales, . "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," ELSE working papers 009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    2. Boris Salazar, 2001. "¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 52-77, July-Dece.
    3. Bosch-Domenech, Antoni & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2001. "Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 105-137, August.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Doris Szoncsitz).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.