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Hétérogénéité structurelle des pays membres et conflit dobjectifs entre les autorités économiques dans l'UEM

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  • Séverine Menguy

Abstract

[fre] De nombreuses études ont souligné le conflit d’objectifs entre les autorités économiques européennes suite à un choc d’offre négatif : la politique monétaire est restrictive pour préserver la stabilité des prix et les politiques budgétaires expansives pour soutenir l’activité économique. L’objectif de ce papier est d’étendre ce résultat aux conséquences de l’hétérogénéité structurelle entre les pays membres d’une union monétaire. Le caractère restrictif de la politique monétaire dépend alors des canaux de transmission qui apparaissent hétérogènes. Et dans certaines configurations conjoncturelles et structurelles, en particulier pour des pays aux tailles très différentes, l’hétérogénéité structurelle peut accentuer le conflit d’objectifs entre la banque centrale et les gouvernements et aggraver la surenchère de hausses des taux d’intérêt et de déficits publics excessifs. [eng] Many studies have underlined the conflict of goals between European economic authorities after a negative supply shock : monetary policy is restrictive to preserve price stability, whereas fiscal policies are expansive to sustain economic activity. Our study extends this result to the consequences of structural heterogeneity between member countries of a monetary union. In a union, monetary-policy tightness depends on transmission channels, which are clearly heterogeneous. In certain short-term and structural configurations – in particular for countries of very different size – structural heterogeneity can accentuate the conflict of goals between the central bank and the governments ; it can also aggravate the escalation of interest-rate hikes and excessive public deficits.

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  • Séverine Menguy, 2005. "Hétérogénéité structurelle des pays membres et conflit dobjectifs entre les autorités économiques dans l'UEM," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 169(3), pages 41-58.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2005_num_169_3_7012
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2005.7012
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2005.7012
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    1. Oros, Cornel & Zimmer, Blandine, 2015. "Uncertainty and fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why does monetary policy transmission matter?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 85-93.
    2. BIKAI, J. Landry & KENKOUO, Guy Albert, 2015. "Analysis and evaluation of the Monetary Policy Transmission Channels in the CEMAC: A SVAR and SPVAR Approaches," MPRA Paper 78227, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Cornel Oros, 2008. "Macroeconomic stabilization in a heterogeneous monetary union: some insights into the effects of fiscal policy coordination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(34), pages 1-12.

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