Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
strategic games; coalitional interval games; superadditive games; axiomatic characterization; C71; C72;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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