Banzhaf LikeValue for Games with Interval Uncertainty
AbstractThis paper focuses on the Banzhaf value for cooperative games with a finite set of players where the coalition values, expressed by the characteristic function, are compact intervals of the real numbers. We generalize the Banzhaf value for TU-cooperative games to the class of games with interval uncertainty which have many applications. Furthermore the Banzhaf like value is here characterized through some axioms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal Czech Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 7 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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