The Truncated Core for Games with Limited Aspirations
AbstractWe define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 1010.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
More information through EDIRC
games with limited aspirations; truncated core.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Pickl, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2004.
"How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims?,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-140855, Tilburg University.
- Branzei,R. & Dimitrov,D. & Pickl,S. & Tijs,S., 2002. "How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims?," Working Papers 339, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- BrÃ¢nzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Pickl, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "How to Cope with Division Problems under Interval Uncertainty of Claims?," Discussion Paper 2002-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Mendez & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Anne van den Nouweland, 2005. "Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-16, University of Oregon Economics Department.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs & Rodica Branzei, 2003.
"Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games,"
AccessEcon, vol. 3(9), pages 1-8.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marisa Cerantola).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.