Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 41 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
Emissions trading; Tacit collusion; Market power; Competition laws; European emissions trading law; K23; L13; Q28;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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