Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
AbstractWe investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms compete in quantities and production is polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pollution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp813.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-03-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENV-2012-03-08 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IND-2012-03-08 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1989. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Working Papers e-89-3, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
- Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta, 1999.
"Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 211-232, May.
- Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta, 1999. "Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives," Staff General Research Papers 1700, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Gaudet, G. & Salant, S., 1989.
"Towards A Theory Of Horizontal Mergers,"
89-24, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W, 1991. "Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 658-65, June.
- Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Christian Hoppe & Ralf Löschel, 2008. "Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(3), pages 347-361, November.
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