Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique
Abstract[fre] Nous montrons que quand des firmes polluantes sont des concurrents à la Cournot, elles peuvent avoir une incitation à utiliser des permis de pollution comme moyen indirect de coordonner leur production. Si les firmes sont initialement identiques, les échanges de permis peuvent conduire à un oligopole asymétrique. Le cas de firmes initialement asymétriques est aussi considéré. [eng] Emissions Trading and Asymmetric Oligopoly by Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran . We show that when polluting firms are Cournot competitors, they may have an incentive to use emissions trading to indirectly co-ordinate their production. If the firms are initially identical, emissions trading can create an asymmetric oligopoly. The case of initially asymmetric firms is also considered.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.
Volume (Year): 143 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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