Multi-Sector Model of Tradable Emission Permits
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
Tradable emission permits; Initial allocation; Multi-sector model; Cournot oligopoly; Market power; Q58; L51;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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