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Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach

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Author Info

  • Long, N.V.
  • Soubeyran, A.

Abstract

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits etc...) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision. Alternatively, one may think of a government that attempts to maximize social welfare, by setting parameters in stage one, subject to the constraint that in stage two, firms are Cournot oligopolists.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 98a22.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a22

Contact details of provider:
Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Phone: 04.91.14.07.70
Fax: 04.91.90.02.27
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Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
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Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES;

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Cited by:
  1. Nilssen, Tore & Pita Barros, Pedro Luis, 1998. "Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity," CEPR Discussion Papers 1986, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2004. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, January.
  3. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes, and Asymmetric International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-30, CIRANO.
  4. Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Christian Hoppe & Ralf Löschel, 2008. "Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(3), pages 347-361, November.
  5. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Collusive Allocation of Tradeable Pollution Permits," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-31, CIRANO.
  6. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "Emission Taxes and Standards for an Asymmetric Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-07, CIRANO.
  7. Ngo Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2005. "Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 421-454, 02.
  8. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-33, May.
  9. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
  10. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "Favoritism in Vertical Relationship: Input Prices and Access Quality," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-14, CIRANO.
  11. Antoine Soubeyran & Ngo Van Long, 2000. "Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 83-89.
  12. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Input Price Discrimination, Access Pricing, and Bypass," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-23, CIRANO.

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