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Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach


  • Van Long, N.
  • Soubeyran, A.


This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits, etc) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Long, N. & Soubeyran, A., 1997. "Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 174, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:inecpu:174

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Russell Davidson & James G. MacKinnon, 1996. "The Size and Power of Bootstrap Tests," Working Papers 932, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    2. M. H. Pesaran, 1974. "On the General Problem of Model Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 153-171.
    3. Horowitz, Joel L., 1994. "Bootstrap-based critical values for the information matrix test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 395-411, April.
    4. McAleer, Michael, 1995. "The significance of testing empirical non-nested models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 149-171, May.
    5. Russell Davidson & James G. Mackinnon, 1982. "Some Non-Nested Hypothesis Tests and the Relations Among Them," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 551-565.
    6. Godfrey, Leslie G, 1983. "Testing Non-Nested Models after Estimation by Instrumental Variables or Least Squares," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 355-365, March.
    7. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1999. "The Size Distortion Of Bootstrap Tests," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(03), pages 361-376, June.
    8. Michelis, Leo, 1999. "The distributions of the J and Cox non-nested tests in regression models with weakly correlated regressors," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 369-401, December.
    9. Godfrey, L. G. & Pesaran, M. H., 1983. "Tests of non-nested regression models: Small sample adjustments and Monte Carlo evidence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 133-154, January.
    10. Fisher, Gordon R. & McAleer, Michael, 1981. "Alternative procedures and associated tests of significance for non-nested hypotheses," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 103-119, May.
    11. Yanqin Fan & Qi Li, 1995. "Bootstrapping J-type tests for non-nested regression models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 107-112, May.
    12. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1981. "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 781-793, May.
    13. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1998. "Graphical Methods for Investigating the Size and Power of Hypothesis Tests," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 66(1), pages 1-26, January.
    14. Godfrey, L. G., 1998. "Tests of non-nested regression models some results on small sample behaviour and the bootstrap," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 59-74, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Christian Hoppe & Ralf Löschel, 2008. "Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(3), pages 347-361, November.
    2. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "Emission Taxes and Standards for an Asymmetric Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-07, CIRANO.
    3. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Input Price Discrimination, Access Pricing, and Bypass," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-23, CIRANO.
    4. Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2004. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, January.
    5. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 83-89.
    6. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    7. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Collusive Allocation of Tradeable Pollution Permits," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-31, CIRANO.
    8. Barros, Pedro P & Nilssen, Tore, 1999. " Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 597-616, December.
    9. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-533, May.
    10. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "Favoritism in Vertical Relationship: Input Prices and Access Quality," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-14, CIRANO.
    11. Ngo Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2005. "Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 421-454, February.
    12. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes, and Asymmetric International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-30, CIRANO.

    More about this item



    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection


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