Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach
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Other versions of this item:
- Van Long, N. & Soubeyran, A., 1997. "Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 174, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
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- Barros, Pedro P & Nilssen, Tore, 1999. " Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 597-616, December.
- Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001.
"Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-533, May.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-13, CIRANO.
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Christian Hoppe & Ralf Löschel, 2008. "Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(3), pages 347-361, November.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "Favoritism in Vertical Relationship: Input Prices and Access Quality," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-14, CIRANO.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "Emission Taxes and Standards for an Asymmetric Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-07, CIRANO.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Input Price Discrimination, Access Pricing, and Bypass," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-23, CIRANO.
- Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2004. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 83-89.
- Ngo Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2005.
"Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 421-454, February.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2002. "Selective Penalization Of Polluters: An Inf-Convolution Approach," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-40, CIRANO.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998.
"Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997. "Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-21, CIRANO.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes, and Asymmetric International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-30, CIRANO.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1998. "Collusive Allocation of Tradeable Pollution Permits," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-31, CIRANO.
More about this item
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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