Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eftichios Sartzetakis

    ()

Abstract

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/B:EARE.0000016786.09344.d4
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-19

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:27:y:2004:i:1:p:1-19

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Related research

Keywords: competitive trading of emission permits; economic efficiency; oligopolistic product market;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gaudet, G. & Salant, S., 1988. "Uniqueness Of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods," Papers 89-10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  2. Van Long, N. & Soubeyran, A., 1997. "Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 174, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
  3. Barbara J. Spencer, 1996. "Quota Licenses for Imported Capital Equipment: Could Bureaucrats Ever DoBetter than the Market?," NBER Working Papers 5695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr, 1993. "Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, April.
  5. Hahn, Robert W., 1982. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," Working Papers 402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Fershtman, C. & Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1996. "Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly," Discussion Paper 1996-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Borenstein, Severin, 1988. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Operating Licenses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 357-85, May.
  8. Misiolek, Walter S. & Elder, Harold W., 1989. "Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 156-166, March.
  9. Eftichios Sartzetakis, 1997. "Tradeable emission permits regulations in the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets: Welfare implications," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(1), pages 65-81, January.
  10. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Working Papers 516, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Nishimura, Kazuo & Friedman, James, 1981. "Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(3), pages 637-48, October.
  12. Malueg, David A., 1990. "Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 66-77, January.
  13. Antoine Soubeyran & Ngo Van Long, 2000. "Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 83-89.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Chevallier, Julien, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4228, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Lozano, S. & Villa, G. & Brännlund, R., 2009. "Centralised reallocation of emission permits using DEA," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(3), pages 752-760, March.
  3. Chevallier, Julien, 2006. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Allocation Rules: Gainers, Losers and the Spectre of Market Power," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4615, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Hahn, Robert W. & Stavins, Robert N., 2010. "The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance," Working paper 47, Regulation2point0.
  5. Hatcher, Aaron, 2012. "Market power and compliance with output quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 255-269.
  6. Meredith Fowlie, 2008. "Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage," NBER Working Papers 14421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Panos Hatzipanayotou & Fabio Antoniou & Phoebe Koundouri, 2010. "Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping," Working Papers 2010.2, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Harrie A. A Verbon & Cees A. Withagen, 2005. "Tradable Emission Permits in a Federal System," CESifo Working Paper Series 1482, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Sang-Ho Lee & Sang-Ha Park, 2005. "Tradable Emission Permits Regulations: The Role of Product Differentiation," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 4(3), pages 249-261, December.
  10. Chevallier, Julien, 2011. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power : A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4601, Paris Dauphine University.
  11. Guy Meunier, 2011. "Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 347-364, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:27:y:2004:i:1:p:1-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.