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On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

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  • Eftichios Sartzetakis

Abstract

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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  • Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2004. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:27:y:2004:i:1:p:1-19
    DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000016786.09344.d4
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    Cited by:

    1. Phoebe Koundouri & Fabio Antoniou & Panos Hatzipanayotou, 2010. "Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping," DEOS Working Papers 1002, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    2. Mariel Leal & Arturo Garcia & Sang-Ho Lee, 2019. "Excess Burden of Taxation and Environmental Policy Mix with a Consumer-Friendly Firm," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 517-536, December.
    3. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, 2011. "The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 267-294.
    4. Creti, Anna & Sanin, María-Eugenia, 2017. "Does environmental regulation create merger incentives?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 618-630.
    5. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power: A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Working Papers halshs-00388207, HAL.
    6. Lee, Sang-Ho & Park, Chul-Hi, 2020. "Environmental Regulations in Private and Mixed Duopolies: Emission Taxes versus Green R&D Subsidies," MPRA Paper 98833, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Guy Meunier, 2011. "Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 347-364, November.
    8. Julien Chevallier, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," Working Papers hal-04139220, HAL.
    9. García, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018. "Time-inconsistent environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm: Tradable permits versus emission tax," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 523-537.
    10. Woerdman Edwin & Nentjes Andries, 2019. "Emissions Trading Hybrids: The Case of the EU ETS," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-32, March.
    11. Sang-Ho Lee & Sang-Ha Park, 2005. "Tradable Emission Permits Regulations: The Role of Product Differentiation," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 4(3), pages 249-261, December.
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4228 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Tang, Maogang & Li, Zhen & Hu, Fengxia & Wu, Baijun & Zhang, Ruihan, 2021. "Market failure, tradable discharge permit, and pollution reduction: Evidence from industrial firms in China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    14. Meredith Fowlie, 2008. "Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage," NBER Working Papers 14421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Catola, Marco & D'Alessandro, Simone, 2020. "Market competition, lobbying influence and environmental externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    16. Lozano, S. & Villa, G. & Brännlund, R., 2009. "Centralised reallocation of emission permits using DEA," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(3), pages 752-760, March.
    17. Jung, Jihyeok & Moon, Saedaseul & Yeo, Sangmin & Lee, Deok-Joo, 2023. "How would the carbon market affect the choice of input factors for production? A duopolistic model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 282(C).
    18. Harrie A.A. Verbon & Cees A. Withagen, 2004. "Tradable emission permits in a federal system," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/83, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    19. Hatcher, Aaron, 2012. "Market power and compliance with output quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 255-269.
    20. Yoon, Kyoung-Soo & Oh, Hyungna, 2021. "Impacts of ETS allocation rules on abatement investment and market structure," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    21. Cotton, Deborah & De Mello, Lurion, 2014. "Econometric analysis of Australian emissions markets and electricity prices," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 475-485.
    22. Kazuhiko Kato, 2006. "Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 88(3), pages 263-283, September.
    23. André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis Miguel, 2015. "Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," MPRA Paper 61770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Allocation Rules: Gainers, Losers and the Spectre of Market Power," Working Papers halshs-00124713, HAL.

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