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Understanding and managing behavioural risks: the case of malpractice in poultry production

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  • Norbert Hirschauer

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  • Stefan Zwoll

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-008-9051-0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 27-60

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:26:y:2008:i:1:p:27-60

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Behavioural economic analysis; Control theories; Economic misconduct; Moral hazard; Protective factors; A13; K32; K42;

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References

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  1. Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta & Jensen, Helen H., 2003. "Systemic failure in the provision of safe food," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 77-96, February.
  2. Nooteboom, Bart, 1995. "Trust, opportunism and governance," Research Report 95B34, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  3. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1991. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 3588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Allen, F. & Gale, D., 1990. "Measurement Distortion And Missing Contingencies In Optimal Contracts," Weiss Center Working Papers 26-90, Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research.
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
  6. Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000036, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Mirrlees, J A, 1999. "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 3-21, January.
  9. Scholz, John T & Gray, Wayne B, 1990. " OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 283-305, September.
  10. Hirschman, Albert O, 1984. "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 89-96, May.
  11. Sverre Grepperud, 2007. "Environmental voluntary behaviour and crowding-out effects: regulation or laissez-faire?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 135-149, April.
  12. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
  13. Claude Ménard & Peter G. Klein, 2004. "Organizational Issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 750-755.
  14. Nuno Garoupa, 2003. "Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-15, January.
  15. Lyons, Bruce R & Mehta, Judith, 1997. "Contracts, Opportunism and Trust: Self-Interest and Social Orientation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 239-57, March.
  16. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  17. Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 2005. "Ethics and Economic Policy for the Food System," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1097-1112.
  18. Hirschauer, Norbert & Musshoff, Oliver, 2007. "A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 246-265, April.
  19. Nooteboom, B. & Berger, H. & Noorderhaven, N.G., 1997. "Effects of trust and governance on relational risk," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73834, Tilburg University.
  20. Simon, Herbert A, 1986. "Rationality in Psychology and Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S209-24, October.
  21. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA.
  22. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-48, March.
  23. Claude Ménard & Peter G. Klein, 2004. "Organizational Issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach," Industrial Organization 0401005, EconWPA.
  24. S. Andrew Starbird, 2005. "Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 15-27.
  25. Hirschauer, Norbert, 2004. "A model-based approach to moral hazard in food chains - What contribution do principal-agent-models make to the understanding of food risks induced by opportunistic behaviour?," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 53(5).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Müller, Kirsten & Musshoff, Oliver & Weber, Ron, 2014. "The more the better? How collateral levels affect credit risk in agricultural microfinance," DARE Discussion Papers 1402, Georg-August University of Göttingen, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development (DARE).
  2. Miroslava Bavorová & Norbert Hirschauer & Gaetano Martino, 2014. "Food safety and network governance structure of the agri-food system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-11, February.

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