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Probabilistic Selling for Vertically Differentiated Products with Salient Thinkers

Author

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  • Quan Zheng

    (International Institute of Finance, School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, People’s Republic of China)

  • Xiajun Amy Pan

    (Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611)

  • Janice E. Carrillo

    (Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611)

Abstract

This paper studies probabilistic selling for vertically differentiated products, whereby consumers do not know the exact identity of a product until after making the purchase. An important feature of probabilistic selling overlooked by previous literature is that it changes the product line, which often determines consumers’ choice context. Our work discovers the crucial role of context effects taking into account consumers’ salient thinking behavior: consumers focus their limited attention on and hence overweight the salient attribute of a product in their perception, leading to context-dependent preferences. We show that probabilistic selling can improve the seller’s profit with salient thinkers even when this strategy does not emerge with rational consumers. With salient thinking, the probabilistic product enables the seller to transform the consumers’ choice context favorably and direct their attention to quality. Our findings demonstrate the importance of exploiting consumers’ salient thinking behavior and suggest that probabilistic selling, as a context management tool, can be more beneficial than previously shown.

Suggested Citation

  • Quan Zheng & Xiajun Amy Pan & Janice E. Carrillo, 2019. "Probabilistic Selling for Vertically Differentiated Products with Salient Thinkers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 442-460, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:38:y:2019:i:3:p:442-460
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2018.1145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Hou, Rui & Zhao, You & Zhu, Mengqiang & Lin, Xiaogang, 2021. "Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store†channel," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Guang Yang & Ying Wang & Mulin Liu, 2023. "Optimal Policy for Probabilistic Selling with Three-Way Revenue Sharing Contract under the Perspective of Sustainable Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-22, February.
    5. Yuan, Yichao & Xiao, Tiaojun, 2023. "Revelation mechanism and decoy strategy for a supply chain with consumer's perceived substitutability," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    6. Helfrich, Magdalena & Herweg, Fabian, 2020. "Context-dependent preferences and retailing: Vertical restraints on internet sales," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    7. Schäfers, Sebastian, 2022. "Product Lotteries and Loss Aversion," Working papers 2022/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    8. Ying He & Huaxia Rui, 2022. "Probabilistic selling in vertically differentiated markets: The role of substitution," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(11), pages 4191-4204, November.
    9. Guo, Xiaolong & Bian, Junsong & Wu, Peiyan & Shi, Victor & Chen, Huangen, 2023. "Probabilistic product design with regret-anticipated consumers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 263(C).

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