Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk
AbstractWe present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By specifying decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from prospect theory, which we test. JEL Codes: D03, D81. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard University OpenScholar in its series Working Paper with number 29210.
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- Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk," NBER Working Papers 16387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Bordalo, Pedro & Gennaioli, Nicola, 2012. "Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk," Scholarly Articles 10636303, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Andrei Shleifer & Nicola Gennaioli & Pedro Bordalo, 2011. "Salience theory of choice under risk," 2011 Meeting Papers 1442, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-15 (All new papers)
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