IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v15y2023i4p3771-d1073053.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Policy for Probabilistic Selling with Three-Way Revenue Sharing Contract under the Perspective of Sustainable Supply Chain

Author

Listed:
  • Guang Yang

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China)

  • Ying Wang

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China)

  • Mulin Liu

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China)

Abstract

Probabilistic selling (PS) is widely used in the travel industry and marketing practices; how to design a win-win contract using PS in multiple participants’ supply chain to achieve sustainable development has been a worthy concerned issue in the green supply chain development in China. To end this, we consider a three-players supply chain involving two firms and a common retailer in which the firms sell their transparent products via a dual channel, while the retailer sells probabilistic goods by a direct channel. First, the three players’ demand functions are derived using both a Hotelling model and taking account of consumers’ price reference effects. Second, we construct a probabilistic selling model for both decentralized and centralized supply chain systems. The optimal policies for the decentralized system are determined by employing Stackelberg sequential games and an analytical approach. Third, we propose a new three-way revenue sharing contract to deal with channel conflict. Furthermore, we determine the conditions under which the dual-channel supply chain can be coordinated to achieve a win–win situation for all participants. The results indicate that the retailer adopts probabilistic selling depending upon the relative values of the two manufacturers’ production costs in the three-way revenue sharing contract. More interestingly, PS not only can improve the supply chain’s efficiency, but also can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain to achieve a win-win situation for all participants. Finally, we present a numerical analysis to verify our results and a sensitivity analysis of the parameters involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Guang Yang & Ying Wang & Mulin Liu, 2023. "Optimal Policy for Probabilistic Selling with Three-Way Revenue Sharing Contract under the Perspective of Sustainable Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-22, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:3771-:d:1073053
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/4/3771/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/4/3771/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zhang, Jie & Kevin Chiang, Wei–yu & Liang, Liang, 2014. "Strategic pricing with reference effects in a competitive supply chain," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 126-135.
    2. Yongbo Xiao & Jian Chen, 2014. "Evaluating the potential effects from probabilistic selling of similar products," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(8), pages 604-620, December.
    3. Rachel R. Chen & Esther Gal-Or & Paolo Roma, 2014. "Opaque Distribution Channels for Competing Service Providers: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanisms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 733-750, August.
    4. Fay, Scott & Xie, Jinhong & Feng, Cong, 2015. "The Effect of Probabilistic Selling on the Optimal Product Mix," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 451-467.
    5. Musen Xue & Wansheng Tang & Jianxiong Zhang, 2016. "Optimal dynamic pricing for deteriorating items with reference-price effects," International Journal of Systems Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 2022-2031, July.
    6. Zhenyu Hu & Xin Chen & Peng Hu, 2016. "Technical Note—Dynamic Pricing with Gain-Seeking Reference Price Effects," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 150-157, February.
    7. Jidong Zhou, 2011. "Reference Dependence and Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 1073-1097, December.
    8. Zizhuo Wang, 2016. "Technical Note—Intertemporal Price Discrimination via Reference Price Effects," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 290-296, April.
    9. Azoury, Katy S. & Miyaoka, Julia, 2020. "Optimal and simple approximate solutions to a production-inventory system with stochastic and deterministic demand," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 286(1), pages 178-189.
    10. Guowei Liu & Suresh P. Sethi & Jianxiong Zhang, 2016. "Myopic vs. far-sighted behaviours in a revenue-sharing supply chain with reference quality effects," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(5), pages 1334-1357, March.
    11. Prakash, David & Spann, Martin, 2022. "Dynamic pricing and reference price effects," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 300-314.
    12. Tingliang Huang & Yimin Yu, 2014. "Sell Probabilistic Goods? A Behavioral Explanation for Opaque Selling," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(5), pages 743-759, September.
    13. Dye, Chung-Yuan & Yang, Chih-Te, 2016. "Optimal dynamic pricing and preservation technology investment for deteriorating products with reference price effects," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 52-67.
    14. Fay, Scott, 2008. "Selling an opaque product through an intermediary: The case of disguising one's product," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 59-75.
    15. Scott Fay & Jinhong Xie, 2010. "The Economics of Buyer Uncertainty: Advance Selling vs. Probabilistic Selling," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(6), pages 1040-1057, 11-12.
    16. Chakraborty, Tulika & Chauhan, Satyaveer S. & Vidyarthi, Navneet, 2015. "Coordination and competition in a common retailer channel: Wholesale price versus revenue-sharing mechanisms," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 103-118.
    17. Quan Zheng & Xiajun Amy Pan & Janice E. Carrillo, 2019. "Probabilistic Selling for Vertically Differentiated Products with Salient Thinkers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 442-460, May.
    18. Juanjuan Qin & Kun Wang & Ziping Wang & Liangjie Xia, 2020. "Revenue sharing contracts for horizontal capacity sharing under competition," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 291(1), pages 731-760, August.
    19. Lin, Zhibing, 2016. "Price promotion with reference price effects in supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 52-68.
    20. Tatyana Chernonog, 2021. "Strategic information sharing in online retailing under a consignment contract with revenue sharing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(2), pages 621-641, May.
    21. M. Güler & Taner Bi̇lgi̇ç & Refi̇k Güllü, 2014. "Joint inventory and pricing decisions with reference effects," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(4), pages 330-343.
    22. Scott Fay & Jinhong Xie, 2015. "Timing of Product Allocation: Using Probabilistic Selling to Enhance Inventory Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(2), pages 474-484, February.
    23. Sammi Y. Tang & Panos Kouvelis, 2014. "Pay-Back-Revenue-Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 23(12), pages 2089-2102, December.
    24. Dmitry Shapiro & Xianwen Shi, 2008. "Market Segmentation: The Role of Opaque Travel Agencies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 803-837, December.
    25. M. Güler & Taner Bilgiç & Refik Güllü, 2015. "Joint pricing and inventory control for additive demand models with reference effects," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 226(1), pages 255-276, March.
    26. Zelin Zhang & Kissan Joseph & Ramanathan Subramaniam, 2015. "Probabilistic Selling in Quality-Differentiated Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(8), pages 1959-1977, August.
    27. Zhong, Yuanguang & Liu, Ju & Zhou, Yong-Wu & Cao, Bin & Cheng, T.C. Edwin, 2022. "Robust contract design and coordination under consignment contracts with revenue sharing," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 253(C).
    28. Kinshuk Jerath & Serguei Netessine & Senthil K. Veeraraghavan, 2010. "Revenue Management with Strategic Customers: Last-Minute Selling and Opaque Selling," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(3), pages 430-448, March.
    29. Scott Fay & Jinhong Xie, 2008. "Probabilistic Goods: A Creative Way of Selling Products and Services," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(4), pages 674-690, 07-08.
    30. Yeu-Shiang Huang & Tzu-Yi Wu & Chih-Chiang Fang & Tzu-Liang (Bill) Tseng, 2021. "Decisions on Probabilistic Selling for Consumers with Different Risk Attitudes," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 121-138, June.
    31. Zhang, Jie & Chiang, Wei-yu Kevin, 2020. "Durable goods pricing with reference price effects," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    32. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2021. "Dynamic oligopoly pricing with reference-price effects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(3), pages 1006-1016.
    33. Lihao Lu & Qinglong Gou & Wansheng Tang & Jianxiong Zhang, 2016. "Joint pricing and advertising strategy with reference price effect," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(17), pages 5250-5270, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yifan Wu & Shibo Jin, 2022. "Joint pricing and inventory decision under a probabilistic selling strategy," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 1209-1233, April.
    2. Guo, Xiaolong & Bian, Junsong & Wu, Peiyan & Shi, Victor & Chen, Huangen, 2023. "Probabilistic product design with regret-anticipated consumers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 263(C).
    3. Yeu-Shiang Huang & Tzu-Yi Wu & Chih-Chiang Fang & Tzu-Liang (Bill) Tseng, 2021. "Decisions on Probabilistic Selling for Consumers with Different Risk Attitudes," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 121-138, June.
    4. Zhang, Yi & Hua, Guowei & Cheng, T.C.E. & Zhang, Juliang & Fernandez, Vicenc, 2020. "Risk pooling through physical probabilistic selling," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 295-311.
    5. Feng, Bo & Mao, Zhaofang & Li, Hui, 2021. "Choices for competing service providers with heterogeneous customers: Traditional versus opaque sales modes," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    6. Junhai Ma & Zhanbing Guo, 2017. "Implications for Firms with Limited Information to Take Advantage of Reference Price Effect in Competitive Settings," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2017, pages 1-16, June.
    7. Quan Zheng & Xiajun Amy Pan & Janice E. Carrillo, 2019. "Probabilistic Selling for Vertically Differentiated Products with Salient Thinkers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 442-460, May.
    8. Yuetao Gao & Yue Wu, 2023. "Regulating Probabilistic Selling of Counterfeits," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4498-4517, August.
    9. Qing Li & Christopher S. Tang & He Xu, 2020. "Mitigating the Double‐Blind Effect in Opaque Selling: Inventory and Information," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(1), pages 35-54, January.
    10. Ying He & Huaxia Rui, 2022. "Probabilistic selling in vertically differentiated markets: The role of substitution," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(11), pages 4191-4204, November.
    11. Mao, Zhaofang & Liu, Wei & Feng, Bo, 2019. "Opaque distribution channels for service providers with asymmetric capacities: Posted-price mechanisms," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 112-120.
    12. Zhang, Juliang & Deng, Lan & Liu, Huimin & Cheng, T.C.E., 2022. "Which strategy is better for managing multi-product demand uncertainty: Inventory substitution or probabilistic selling?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(1), pages 79-95.
    13. Aleksandra Kovacheva & Hristina Nikolova, 2024. "Uncertainty marketing tactics: An overview and a unifying framework," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 1-22, January.
    14. Adam N. Elmachtoub & Michael L. Hamilton, 2021. "The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(8), pages 4686-4702, August.
    15. Fu, Qi & Wang, Qifei & Xu, Xiaoya & Lian, Zhaotong, 2017. "A two-product newsvendor system with a flexible product," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 590-601.
    16. Yong Chao & Lin Liu & Dongyuan Zhan, 2016. "Vertical Probabilistic Selling under Competition: the Role of Consumer Anticipated Regret," Working Papers 16-14, NET Institute.
    17. Ningyuan Chen & Adam N. Elmachtoub & Michael L. Hamilton & Xiao Lei, 2021. "Loot Box Pricing and Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(8), pages 4809-4825, August.
    18. Anton, Ramona & Chenavaz, Régis Y. & Paraschiv, Corina, 2023. "Dynamic pricing, reference price, and price-quality relationship," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    19. Wang, Qiang & Zhao, Nenggui & Wu, Jie & Zhu, Qingyuan, 2021. "Optimal pricing and inventory policies with reference price effect and loss-Averse customers," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    20. Fay, Scott & Xie, Jinhong & Feng, Cong, 2015. "The Effect of Probabilistic Selling on the Optimal Product Mix," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 451-467.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:3771-:d:1073053. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.