Vagueness, credibility, and government policy
AbstractA discussion of the reasons why it may be in a government agency's--and society's--best interest to be vague about policy objectives. Using the concept of "cheap talk," the author explains that when an agency faces a trade-off between precise and credible announcements, its best move may be to provide truthful but limited information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its journal Economic Review.
Volume (Year): (1995)
Issue (Month): Q I ()
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- Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990.
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892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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