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Stock Price Manipulation: The Role of Intermediaries

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Author Info
Siddiqi, Hammad

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Abstract

We model stock price manipulation when the manipulator is in the role of an intermediary (broker). We find that in the absence of superior information, the broker can manipulate equilibrium outcomes without losing credibility with respect to accurate forecasting. This result extends to the case when the broker prefers more investment to come into the market. However, when competition among brokers is introduced then the investors get their favorite outcome in the absence of superior information. This result has important implications for encouraging broker competitions in developing markets. Many developing markets are still not demutualized; hence broker level competition is limited in such markets.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6374/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6374.

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Date of creation: Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6374

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Related research
Keywords: Stock Price Manipulation Broker Manipulation Broker Competition Broker Bias Emerging Markets Market Microstructure

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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  1. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
  2. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-23, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1992. "Stock-Price Manipulation," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 503-29. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 221-237, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz & Mian, Atif, 2005. "Unchecked intermediaries: Price manipulation in an emerging stock market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 203-241, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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