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Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

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  • Vicki Bier
  • Naraphorn Haphuriwat

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate how many containers would need to be screened in order to deter attackers from attempting to smuggle weapons into a defending country in container freight. We hypothesize that with a sufficiently high probability of being detected, attackers might be deterred from smuggling attempts. Thus, our goal is to identify the optimal proportion of containers to inspect in order to minimize the defender’s expected loss, using game theory to reflect the fact that attackers are simultaneously trying to maximize their expected rewards. Moreover, our model recognizes that the container-screening policy must simultaneously protect against different types of threats (such as nuclear bombs, dirty bombs, and assault rifles). Finally, our model also suggests that threatening to retaliate against attacks may be beneficial to defenders, as long as the threat is credible. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

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  • Vicki Bier & Naraphorn Haphuriwat, 2011. "Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 137-158, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:187:y:2011:i:1:p:137-158:10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6
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    Cited by:

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    2. Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2016. "Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 7-26, February.
    3. Agarwal, Puneet & Aziz, Ridwan Al & Zhuang, Jun, 2022. "Interplay of rumor propagation and clarification on social media during crisis events - A game-theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 298(2), pages 714-733.
    4. Bier, Vicki M. & Kosanoglu, Fuat, 2015. "Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 35-46.
    5. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.
    6. Mohammad Ebrahim Nikoofal & Morteza Pourakbar & Mehmet Gumus, 2023. "Securing containerized supply chain through public and private partnership," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2341-2361, July.
    7. Aniruddha Bagchi & Jomon Aliyas Paul, 2014. "Optimal Allocation of Resources in Airport Security: Profiling vs. Screening," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 219-233, April.
    8. Jie Xu & Jun Zhuang & Zigeng Liu, 2016. "Modeling and mitigating the effects of supply chain disruption in a defender–attacker game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 236(1), pages 255-270, January.
    9. Xiaojun (Gene) Shan & Jun Zhuang, 2014. "Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection---A Three-Stage Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 43-62, March.
    10. Jie Xu & Jun Zhuang, 2016. "Modeling costly learning and counter-learning in a defender-attacker game with private defender information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 236(1), pages 271-289, January.
    11. Hoogstrate, André J. & Klaassen, Chris A.J., 2015. "Information weighted sampling for detecting rare items in finite populations with a focus on security," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 241(3), pages 880-887.
    12. Bagchi, Aniruddha & Paul, Jomon A., 2017. "Espionage and the optimal standard of the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program in maritime security," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 262(1), pages 89-107.
    13. Sushil Gupta & Martin K. Starr & Reza Zanjirani Farahani & Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi, 2020. "Prevention of Terrorism–An Assessment of Prior POM Work and Future Potentials," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1789-1815, July.
    14. Yael Deutsch & Boaz Golany, 2016. "Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 237(1), pages 7-26, February.
    15. Kjell Hausken, 2014. "Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(1), pages 89-112, March.
    16. Kosanoglu, Fuat & Bier, Vicki M., 2020. "Target-oriented utility for interdiction of transportation networks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    17. Huseyin Cavusoglu & Young Kwark & Bin Mai & Srinivasan Raghunathan, 2013. "Passenger Profiling and Screening for Aviation Security in the Presence of Strategic Attackers," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 63-81, March.
    18. Bakker, Craig & Webster, Jennifer B. & Nowak, Kathleen E. & Chatterjee, Samrat & Perkins, Casey J. & Brigantic, Robert, 2020. "Multi-Game Modeling for Counter-Smuggling," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    19. Musegaas, Marieke & Schlicher, Loe & Blok, Herman, 2022. "Stackelberg production-protection games: Defending crop production against intentional attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(1), pages 102-119.

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