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Illegal parking and optimal enforcement policies with search friction

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  • Nourinejad, Mehdi
  • Gandomi, Amir
  • Roorda, Matthew J.

Abstract

Illegal parking adversely impacts traffic and creates unsafe conditions for other road users. We present parking enforcement policies to maximize social welfare and profit. We use the bilateral meet function to quantify the friction and characterize key factors of illegal parking behavior. The model shows that the citation probability increases with the violator dwell time but decreases with the violators arrival rate, and drivers are inclined to park illegally when their dwell time is short. We also present a counter-intuitive finding that the citation fine may increase the dwell time of the violators.

Suggested Citation

  • Nourinejad, Mehdi & Gandomi, Amir & Roorda, Matthew J., 2020. "Illegal parking and optimal enforcement policies with search friction," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:141:y:2020:i:c:s1366554520306773
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Kadkhodaei, Masoud & Shad, Rouzbeh & Ziaee, Seyed Ali, 2022. "Affecting factors of double parking violations on urban trips," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 80-88.
    4. Gorji, Mohammad-Ali & Shetab-Boushehri, Seyyed-Nader & Akbarzadeh, Meisam, 2023. "Evaluation and improvement of the resilience of a transportation system against epidemic diseases: A system dynamics approach," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 27-44.

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