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Networks and clubs

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Author Info

  • Page Jr., Frank H.
  • Wooders, Myrna

Abstract

We formulate a club model where players' have identical single-peaked preferences over club sizes as a network formation game. For situations with "many" clubs, we provide necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the farsighted core and the direct (or myopic) core. With "too few" clubs, if players are farsighted then the farsighted core is empty. In this same case, if players are myopic then the direct core is always nonempty and, for any club network in the direct core, clubs are of nearly equal size (i.e., clubs differ in size by at most one member).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 64 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3-4 ()
Pages: 406-425

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:64:y:2007:i:3-4:p:406-425

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords: Clubs Network formation games Path dominance core Nash club equilibria;

References

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  1. Wooders, Myrna, 1978. "Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 328-348, August.
  2. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
  3. Demange, G., 1991. "Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures," DELTA Working Papers 91-16, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  4. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  6. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  7. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "Approximate Cores Of Games And Economies With Clubs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 535, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  8. Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Near-Markets and Market Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 657, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  10. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  12. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.
  13. Shubik, Martin & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "Approximate cores of replica games and economies : Part II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 285-306, December.
  14. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, . "Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games," Economics Working Papers 2000-12, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  15. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation With Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 640, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  16. Gabrielle Demange, 2004. "Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity," DELTA Working Papers 2004-30, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  17. Kirman, Alan P., 1983. "Communication in markets : A suggested approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 101-108.
  18. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1998. "Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 224-244, April.
  19. Konishi, Hideo & Weber, Shlomo & Le Breton, Michel, 1997. "Free mobility equilibrium in a local public goods economy with congestion," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 19-30, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, 2002. "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects and Inequality," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0217, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  2. Frank H. Page, Jr., Myrna H. Wooders, 2009. "Endogenous Network Dynamics," Caepr Working Papers 2009-002, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  3. Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  4. Mauleon, Ana & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2011. "Networks of manufacturers and retailers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 351-367, March.
  5. Myrna Wooders, 2009. "Market Games and Clubs," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0919, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  6. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13063, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  7. Dev, Pritha, 2010. "Choosing `Me' and `My Friends': Identity in a Non-Cooperative Network Formation Game with Cost Sharing," MPRA Paper 21631, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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