Approximate cores of replica games and economies : Part II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 6 (1983)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
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