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The politics of infrastructure investment: The role of product market competition

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  • Ghosh, Arghya
  • Meagher, Kieron

Abstract

In spatial competition, public infrastructure plays a crucial role in determining product market outcomes. In our model, consideration of infrastructure's impact on the product market drives the preferences of consumers in their dual role as voter/taxpayers. The spatial heterogeneity of consumers produces conflicting political interests and in many cases inefficient outcomes. However across both exogenous and endogenous market environments product market competition consistently leads to higher levels of publicly funded infrastructure than monopoly/collusion. Furthermore, competition's boost to the popular support for infrastructure investment is often excessive while monopoly leads to underinvestment.

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  • Ghosh, Arghya & Meagher, Kieron, 2015. "The politics of infrastructure investment: The role of product market competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 308-329.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:119:y:2015:i:c:p:308-329
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.08.017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spatial competition; Infrastructure investment; Salop's circular city; Political economy; Referendum;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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