We analyze free-entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition in which locations of established firms are fixed and entrants' profit expectations are rational. Our most interesting results concern large economies -- economies in which the number of firms is arbitrarily large. When the average cost function is U-shaped, free-entry equilibrium is unique, socially optimal, and characterized by zero profit. In contract, when there are no diseconomies of scale, even large economies are stubbornly imperfect. Firms can earn substantial pure profit and free-entry equilibrium is neither unique nor socially optimal.
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Volume (Year): 16 (1985) Issue (Month): 2 (Summer) Pages: 282-297 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Richard Arnott & Yundong Tu, 2008.
"Shopper City,"
Working Papers
200811, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2008.
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