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Electoral rules, forms of government and redistributive policy: Evidence from agriculture and food policies

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  • Olper, Alessandro
  • Raimondi, Valentina

Abstract

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960–2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies – compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies – give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 141-158

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:141-158

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

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Keywords: Electoral rules; Forms of government; Agriculture and food policy; Political economy;

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Cited by:
  1. Olper, Alessandro & Swinnen, Johan, 2013. "Mass media and public policy : global evidence from agricultural policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 6362, The World Bank.
  2. Jan Fałkowski & Alessandro Olper, 2012. "Political Competition and Policy Choices: The Evidence From Agricultural Protection," Working Papers, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw 2012-18, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.

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