Strategic use of forward contracts and capacity constraints
Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of forward markets under demand uncertainty when oligopolistic firms endogenously choose capacity levels. The paper shows that a forward market that occurs after the investment decision is committed does not increase social welfare if demand uncertainty is relatively small. This result is contradictory to Allaz and Vila (1993) findings that forward markets mitigate market power and enhance efficiency. However, a forward market improves social welfare if demand uncertainty is relatively large. The findings have important policy implications for capital-intensive industries where capacity expansion requires long lead time.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 30 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 164-173
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Related research
Keywords: Capacity constraints; Market power; Forward market; Spot market;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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