The role of technology security in a model of trade with horizontal differentiation
AbstractThe security concerns of exporters of products which might be used for military purposes have motivated different security regimes that limit the quality of the products exported by home firms. At the same time however, home governments want to ensure the competitiveness of their home companies. We analyze the optimal policy of a government facing such a trade off. We present a multistage model in which the government has the ability to commit to R&D subsidies but cannot credibly set its quality restrictions until the outcome of the R&D process is known.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 5 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Other versions of this item:
- Garcia-Alonso, M.C., 1998. "The role of Technology Security in a Model of Trade with Horizontal Differentiation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 423.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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