R&D in Developing Countries: What Should Governments Do?
AbstractI consider the implications of recent research for R&D policy in developing countries. Typical new growth models, which assume free entry and no strategic behaviour by R&D producers, are less appropriate for policy guidance than strategic oligopoly models. But the latter have ambiguous implications for targeted R&D subsidies, and caution against the anticompetitive effect of research joint ventures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by College Dublin, Department of Political Economy- in its series Papers with number 99/27.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Ireland; University College Dublin, Department of Political Economy, Centre for Economic Research, Belfield, Dublin 4
Fax: +353-1-283 0068
Web page: http://www.ucd.ie/economics/
More information through EDIRC
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ; TRADE ; DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
Other versions of this item:
- J.P. Neary, 2000. "R&D in Developing Countries: What Should Governments Do?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0464, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Neary, J.P. & Leahy, D., 1998.
"Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies,"
98/14, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
- Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
- D Leahy & J.P. Neary, 1998. "Strategic Trade and Industrial PolicyTowards Dynamic Oligopolies," CEP Discussion Papers dp0409, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1998. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1968, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jo, Seung-gyu & den Butter, Frank A. G., 2009.
"Pros and Cons of Backing Winners in Innovation Policy,"
17658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Frank A.G. den Butter & Seung-gyu Jo, 2009. "Pros and Cons of ‘Backing Winners’ in Innovation Policy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-012/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- David Vavra, 2002. "Strategic Interactions, Social Optimality and Growth," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp199, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
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