R&D in Developing Countries: What Should Governments Do?
AbstractI consider the implications of recent research for R&D policy in developing countries. Typical new growth models, which assume free entry and no strategic behaviour by R&D producers, are less appropriate for policy guidance than strategic oligopoly models. But the latter have ambiguous implications for targeted R&D subsidies, and caution against the anti-competitive effects of research joint ventures. A better policy is to raise the economy-wide level of research expertise. This avoids the need for governments to pick winners, is less prone to capture, and dilutes the strategic disincentive to undertake R&D with unappropriable spillovers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0464.
Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP
R&D spillovers; R&D cooperative agreements; RJVs (Research Joint Ventures); strategic trade and industrial policy; absorptive capacity;
Other versions of this item:
- Neary, J.P., 1999. "R&D in Developing Countries: What Should Governments Do?," Papers 99/27, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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